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Introduction 
 
Hans-Christian Ørsted introduced the term “thought experiment” to philosophy in 1811, although 
it did not get much philosophical attention until the 1980s. This is therefore a relatively young 
topic of discussion (in philosophical timescales), still concerned with the most fundamental 
questions of what thought experiments are, what they do, and how they do it. This introduction 
will trace some of the work that has been done already. The chapters that follow will take us 
further. 
An enumeration of some classic examples will display how diverse the category of thought 
experiments can be.1 In philosophy, there is Searle’s Chinese room, Putnam’s twin Earth (and 
brain in a vat), Nozick’s experience machine, Rawls’ original position, Jackson/Dennett’s colour 
scientist, Thomson’s violinist, Chalmers’s zombies, Wittgenstein’s beetle, Plato’s cave (and ring 
of Gyges), Quine’s gavagai, Davidson’s Swampman, Poincaré’s diskworld, Foot’s trolley 
problem and many more.2 These thought experiments in large part define the history of 
philosophy and are woven into its pedagogy. Indeed, there is a textbook (now in its fifth edition) 
that aims to introduce students to philosophy entirely through thought experiments (Schick and 
Vaughn 2012). And their power to engage minds often extends beyond philosophy classrooms: 
there are several collections of thought experiments aimed at wider public audiences (e.g., Tittle 
2004; Cohen 2004), and they appear frequently in educational contexts online. 
Thought experiments are equally common in science. Some famous examples include Lucretius’ 
throwing a spear at the edge of the universe, Maxwell’s demon, Einstein’s elevator (and train), 
Schrödinger’s cat, Newton’s bucket (and cannonball), Heisenberg’s microscope, Galileo’s falling 
bodies (and pendulums, inclined planes and ship), the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Stevin’s chain 
draped over a prism. They are found also in pure and applied mathematics, where they play 
important roles from geometry to infinity.3 
While philosophical and scientific thought experiments have stolen most of the scholarly 
spotlight, the scope of thought experiments grows substantially when we recognize the many 
works of art that we can fruitfully characterize as thought experiments. These might include 
paintings such as Jackson Pollock’s “Number One”; novels such as Mark Twain’s Huckleberry 
Finn, Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird, Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, Charles Dickens’ A Tale of 
Two Cities, Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, George Eliot’s Middlemarch, William Shakespeare’s 
Henry V, King Lear and Hamlet, George Orwell’s Animal Farm, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin and E. M. Forster’s Howards End; and films including The Matrix and 2001: A 
Space Odyssey (see Carroll 2002; Wartenberg 2007; Camp 2009; Davies 2012, this volume; 
Elgin 1993, 2014). It might also be useful to discuss the creation and appreciation of art as a kind 
of thought experiment. 
Besides humanistic, scientific and artistic pursuits, thought experiments are deeply important for 
ordinary life (Nersessian 2007). On an inclusive conception of “thought experiment,” simply 
planning out a busy day might require several; figuring out how best to get from one place to 
another, deciding what to eat, etc. Thought experiments and repeated visualizations may also be 
used in therapy, for example, to overcome phobias (Gendler 2004). 
Thought experiments thus form an extremely diverse set of mental activities. Since there is no 
conventional definition, we should resolve to begin our inquiry with as broad a notion as 
possible. That is, we should be aware of and minimize our pre-theoretical definitional criteria 
until we have exposed ourselves to the full diversity of cognitive activities that might warrant the 
label “thought experiment.” Only when it comes time to develop historical, sociological and 
philosophical accounts of thought experiments should we narrow our focus to the subsets and 
properties of thought experiments that interest us. 
We therefore invite the reader to treat this book as a companion, not in the sense of an expert 
guide who can navigate unfamiliar terrain to a predetermined destination, but in the sense of an 
enthusiastic fellow explorer. Our first step (to be taken in Part I) exposes us to many of the 
different types and aims of thought experiments. 
 
Thought experiments in their historical contexts 
 
One important approach to thought experiments is historical, the value of which far outstrips any 
use philosophers make of it. We want to know what role Ibn Sīnā’s (Avicenna’s) thought 
experiments played in his epistemology and how they were received by his contemporaries 
independently of what such an inquiry might tell us about thought experiments in general. 
Focusing on thought experiments merely provides historians with another useful lens through 
which to study thinkers and periods that are already worth studying. And in Part I we look 
through this lens. 
Still, it would be wrong to underplay the close connection between the history and philosophy of 
thought experiments. Generally speaking, historians will not be able to catalogue and analyze 
historical thought experiments without making philosophical assumptions about the nature of 
inference, evidence, imagination and their mutual relations. Conversely, philosophers have no 
hope of producing a general account of thought experiments without the examples and insights 
of historians. In particular, historical studies such as Gellard (2011), Ierodiakonou (2005, 2011), 
Knuuttila and Kukkonen (2011), Kühne (2005), Lautner (2011) and Palmerino (2011) have 
raised important philosophical issues that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. For instance, the 
history of thought experiments shows that many have acquired lives of their own, despite Ian 
Hacking’s (1992) claim to the contrary. This is an important datum for developing ontologies 
and taxonomies of thought experiments (see Bokulich and Frappier, this volume). The 
interdependence of the history and philosophy of thought experiments is clearly reflected in the 
chapters of Part I, which may also serve as an extended introduction to thought experiments and 
(with Part II) a source of evidence against which to test the philosophical claims made in Parts 
III and IV. 
Given the ubiquity of thought experiments, we could not attempt to provide comprehensive 
historical coverage. In the literature to date, there has been a focus on thought experiments in 
Western traditions, mostly following Galileo and the birth of what is called modern science. 
James McAllister (this volume) argues that this focus is appropriate since thought experiments 
are a tool introduced by Galileo with a specific sort of evidential significance linked to the 
Western notion of scientific experiment. For the reasons given above, we have sought chapters 
that go beyond this conception. Plato might be using his imagination in a way that is not the 
same as Galileo’s, but similar enough that we might learn something new about thought 
experiments or thought experiment–like inferences by considering them. So in Part I, we 
tentatively expand our notion of thought experiment, while still covering the cases that are most 
discussed in the literature. We hope this provides a balance between historical scholarship on 
well-known thought experiments and those that are less well-known. In the first category we 
have thought experiments in the presocratics, Plato, Galileo, Newton and Leibniz. In the second 
we have Aristotle, Islamic/Arabic thinkers, Kant, Wittgenstein and Hegel. This selection should 
provide readers who are new to the topic of thought experiments the historical background 
necessary to appreciate the rest of the companion, while readers already comfortable with the 
history of thought experiments will find new scholarship that opens original directions for 
research. In terms of expanding the literature, we have only gone a small fraction of the way. 
Thinkers from feminist philosophy, African, Asian, Latin American traditions and others should 
also be represented in the discussion, as well as disciplines that have not traditionally received 
the attention of philosophers, including architecture, engineering, law and advertising, which are 
all likely to have a great deal to contribute. 
Before moving on, we would like to provide a brief summary of the chapters of Part I. Katerina 
Ierodiakonou in her chapter on the ancients argues that thought experiments were used for three 
main purposes: to support, to attack and to induce suspension of judgment on philosophical 
claims. She considers three illustrative episodes: Archytas of Tarentum’s throwing a spear at the 
edge of the universe, the myth of Gyges in Plato’s Republic, and Sextus Empiricus’ “partless 
places.” Rather than discussing these episodes as thought experiments, Ierodiakonou helpfully 
refers to them as paradeigmata, or “examples.” To illustrate how such examples were 
marshalled, Ierodiakonou considers a few more cases, including the ship of Theseus, 
Chrysippus’ Dion and Theon, and the skepticism-inducing arguments of the stoics and Skeptics. 
In his chapter on Plato, Alexander Becker draws attention to Plato’s many literary devices and 
styles in order to ask how Plato’s fictional creations compare to thought experiments and how we 
are supposed to learn from them. Becker focuses on the Republic, which includes not only what 
we might classify as thought experiments but also a discussion of what we can learn from fiction. 
He identifies three main fictional styles in Plato – myth, simile and dialogue – and relates these 
to the myth of Gyges, the myth of Er, the allegory of the cave, the myth told to the citizens of the 
model city, the construction of the model city, and the Republic itself as a dialogue. 
Klaus Corcilius begins his chapter on Aristotle as Ierodiakonou and Becker do: by admitting 
there is no simple way to read into Aristotle our notion of thought experiment. And this is no 
accident, argues Corcilius, since Aristotle regarded plain-sight observation as superior to the 
“artificial extraction of hidden facts” (this volume, 58). However, “there can be no doubt,” 
Corcilius argues, that Aristotle did use what we call thought experiments. Their principle 
function seems to be to “compensate for a lack of data in epistemically difficult terrain” (60). To 
illustrate what this means and how Aristotle achieves it, Corcilius considers examples from both 
Aristotle’s esoteric writings (dense philosophical notes) and his exoteric (literary) writings. The 
latter include a cave allegory similar to Plato’s and a frightening analogy of the soul’s relation to 
the body in terms of a living person chained to a dead one. The former include “the stripping 
argument,” which analyzes substance itself, imagining if there were a second sun, a 
consideration of “if all things were colours” (or if everything were only one colour), why flesh is 
not the organ of touch, and finally what moves the universe and how. 
Jon McGinnis discusses medieval Arabic/Islamic thought experiments by discussing fictions, 
idealizations and “ingenious machines,” primarily in the work of Ibn Sīnā, but also in Ibn al- 
Haytham, Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī and others. These philosophical tools were put to a variety of 
uses, including supporting modal claims and illustrating ideas. McGinnis shows that the use of 
hypothetical conditionals, a tradition going back to Aristotle, was beginning to be recognized as 
philosophically problematic, especially in connection to its dependence on the imagination. 
McGinnis follows this with a fascinating discussion of an internal sensory faculty introduced by 
Ibn Sīnā to avoid objections about hypothetical counterfactuals called wahm, which is a faculty 
separate from imagination and intellect that enables us to perceive non-sensible features or 
intentions in sensible particular things (as when a sheep perceives the ferocity of a wolf, or I “see 
how you feel”). This faculty was crucial for explaining our ability to grasp mathematical objects, 
work with idealizations and employ thought experiments. McGinnis goes through Ibn Sīnā’s 
famous “flying man” thought experiment and many others to show the creativity and subtlety 
with which thought experiments were used and criticized during this period. 
In striking contrast to the usual way Galileo is presented, Paolo Palmieri rejects the distinction 
between real and thought experiments for Galileo. Instead, Galileo’s “experiential engagements” 
are recast as “projective participations.” One way to put the point is that recent recreations of 
Galileo’s experiments reveal that his experiments, if material, could not have shown what 
Galileo concluded from them. Therefore, the experiments must have been conceived and 
completed always (at least partially) projectively in thought. Palmieri’s second main point is that 
Galileo was not trying to dissolve paradoxes with his experiments. He was celebrating them. To 
show this, he displays some of Galileo’s most beautiful struggles with falling (and floating 
bodies).  
Richard T. W. Arthur fruitfully groups together some deservedly famous thought experiments of 
Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz. These include Newton’s bucket and the Leibniz shifts, 
wherein God creates the universe in a different place, in the same place but rotated, or at a 
different time. The unifying theme of all these thought experiments is the use of 
indistinguishability to show something about the nature of motion and matter. Arthur discusses 
the context and motivations of these thought experiments in relation to the work of other 
philosophers like Descartes, Hobbes and Locke, and shows how historically important theses 
such as Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles were originally grounded in indistinguishability 
thought experiments about matter and motion. The discussion branches out to other 
indistinguishability thought experiments concerning God’s abilities, the nature of perception and 
the nature of mind, one of which anticipates Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment. 
In Chapter 7, Kenneth R. Westphal charts the development of transcendental thought 
experiments found in Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein and others. Westphal prefaces this with a 
historical-philosophical discussion of the nature of philosophy and its limits, especially with 
respect to the possibility of global perceptual skepticism and massive reference failure. Through 
this preface, Westphal breathes life and immediacy into his discussion of these thought 
experiments which are transcendental in the sense that they try to grasp some of our key 
cognitive capacities and their limits. Examples include Kant’s thought experiments that ask us to 
conceive of a complete absence of space or time; Kant’s thought experiment in which there is no 
regularity in the sensory manifold; and Wittgenstein’s thought experiments in On Certainty 
which ask us to violate in imagination some of the most fundamental regularities we know to 
obtain, such as conservation of mass. Despite their apparently external subject matter, these are 
thought experiments about what we can and cannot think. Our failures or difficulties become 
crucial data for the construction of philosophical theory. 
The glimpse provided by Part I into historical uses and examples of thought experiments 
naturally leads to certain philosophical and sociological questions such as: What are the features 
common to (sets of) thought experiments? Do different communities draw different divisions 
between thought experiments, fictions, models and arguments? How contextual are the success 
criteria for thought experiments, and what causes a community to change them? Answering these 
questions requires a somewhat broader perspective, and a natural thing to do is to look at fields 
of inquiry rather than periods and thinkers. For example, what are the sorts of thought 
experiments used in politics, economics, theology, ethics, physics, biology and mathematics? 
What unites them, how are they used and how have they changed? This is the goal of Part II, 
which collects domain-specific observations and presents accounts of the characteristics and 
practices of thought experimentation in the fields just mentioned. This part of the collection is 
organized like the first, to include chapters that summarize and expand on previous work (e.g., in 
physics, mathematics and ethics) with some relatively new areas ripe for cultivation (economics, 
biology, theology and politics). As with the previous section, further expansion is desirable, for 
example, to thought experiments in metaphysics, chemistry, geology, sociology, engineering, 
law, architecture, etc. A brief summary of these chapters follows. 
  
Thought experiments in their disciplinary contexts 
 
Nenad Miščević (co-originator of the mental models account discussed by Nancy Nersessian in 
Chapter 17) discusses thought experiments in political philosophy. These typically present some 
social arrangement, ask us to judge it, and then use that judgement as evidence for a political or 
philosophical claim. From the model city (also discussed by Becker, this volume), we learn 
about justice itself. From behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance, we judge different arrangements of 
“the basic structure” of society and reason about which is best. Similar thought experiments are 
found in Rousseau, Dworkin, Cohen and Kukathas, and many more are collected in Tetlock and 
Belkin’s (1996) Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, which helped to spur 
recent literature on the topic. Miščević considers the characteristics and stages of such thought 
experiments, analyzes historical and contemporary examples, and argues even for the 
indispensability of such thought experiments in political thought by canvassing the possible 
sources of evidence available to political philosophy. Finally, Miščević outlines some general 
desiderata for successful political thought experiments and asks what this discussion can tell us 
about ongoing philosophical issues, such as the status of ideal theories in political reasoning. 
Some authors claim or imply that economics proceeds primarily by thought experiment. Taking 
up a contrary position, Margaret Schabas argues that not only are thought experiments rare in 
economics, but when we do find something that looks like one, it usually isn’t. Her position 
relies on a conception of thought experiments according to which at least some experimental 
manipulation is necessary (which in turn relies on a particular notion of experiment). According 
to this conception, a mathematical model that operates by derivation, no matter how hypothetical 
its content is, cannot be a thought experiment. Schabas also rejects the view that modelling (and 
mental modelling) is experimental. Schabas does identify a few genuine thought experiments in 
economics, such as Hume’s, in which everyone in a society wakes up with an extra five units of 
currency in their pocket. And she is happy to admit that economics is increasingly experimental. 
However, the “thought” and “experiment” portions of economics are not very often combined in 
the way that we see, for example, in physics. Some of these claims are taken up by Julian Reiss 
(this volume), who attempts to explain why there are less thought experiments in economics than 
elsewhere. 
Thought experiments have long been part of the method of theology, but the features of such 
thought experiments and what their involvement says about theology are open questions. Yiftach 
Fehige considers six ways thought experiments and theology have or might come together in 
philosophical discourse. First, there are some who dismiss the use of thought experiments in 
ethics for theological reasons. Second, their appearance in theological contexts has been taken as 
evidence against the reliability of thought experiments in general. Third, the presence of thought 
experiments in both science and theology has been used to argue that there are comparable 
standards of rationality in these two disciplines. Fourth, theological thought experiments have an 
intriguing literary nature that might be helpful in advancing the investigation of thought 
experiments through aesthetics (as in, for example, Davies, this volume; Elgin 2014; and 
Meynell, this volume). Fifth, the claim that philosophy would be impossible (or at least severely 
impoverished) without thought experiments also appears to be true of philosophical theology. 
Finally, what is called revealed theology has its own thought experiments, which are 
fundamentally different from those we find elsewhere. 
This brings us to ethical thought experiments, which are among the most well-known in any 
discipline. Like philosophers of politics (if Miščević is correct), ethicists seem required to appeal 
to thought experiments because normative claims are not amenable to the same sources of 
evidence as less normative disciplines. In his chapter, Georg Brun provides a general 
characterization of ethical thought experiments, including the infamous trolley problem, 
Thomson’s violinist, Singer’s drowning child, Shue’s ticking time bomb diffused by torturing a 
terrorist, and Rawls’ original position. Brun produces a typology and considers objections 
(including moral objections) to the use of thought experiments in ethics. 
Kent A. Peacock turns us to physics, which is the only discipline that could rival philosophy in 
terms of the quantity and historical significance of thought experiments. Though it is an open 
matter whether thought experiments in ethics, epistemology or metaphysics achieve their goals, 
the question in physics is not if, but how. Peacock is more liberal in his characterization of 
thought experiments than Schabas, including even textbook problems that deal with simplified 
scenarios like blocks sliding down inclined planes. Peacock notes that there are thought 
experiments that illustrate or draw attention to certain ideas, but he chooses to focus on those that 
have left indelible marks on physical theory and practice well beyond the intentions of their 
creators. These include Maxwell’s demon, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment, 
Einstein’s riding a light wave, Einstein’s elevator (and its progenitor – an observer falling off a 
roof), Einstein’s “hole” argument, Plank’s oscillators, Einstein’s mirror, Heisenberg’s 
microscope, Schrödinger’s cat and even quantum computation. In all of these cases, theoretical 
solutions to the problems raised by thought experiments, and problems with the theoretical 
solutions suggested by those thought experiments, make up important parts of the history of 
physics. Peacock concludes with a discussion of the future of thought experimentation in 
physics. 
Unlike physics, biology is not brimming with famous thought experiments. Guillaume 
Schlaepfer and Marcel Weber begin their chapter by considering why this might be. For instance, 
the theoretical portion of biology seems to play a “more marginal” role in biology compared to 
the role played by theoretical physics in physics. And biology, unlike physics, has more direct 
experimental access to its systems. This does not mean that there are no interesting thought 
experiments in biology, however. For example, Darwin’s work contains many. Schlaepfer and 
Weber consider Jim Lennox’s (1991) account of these thought experiments and raise some 
interesting questions. For example, if thought experiments should involve the imagination, how 
much imagination do we require for something to count as a thought experiment? This is 
especially poignant in the case of Darwin, whose thought experiments are characteristically full 
of references to empirical evidence. Does this make them less imaginative (and therefore less 
thought experimental)? At this point the chapter turns to the work of mathematically focused 
population geneticists. In this literature we find R. A. Fisher’s sexually reproducing community 
with three (or more) sexes, and other candidates for biological thought experiments. 
 Finally, Irina Starikova and Marcus Giaquinto tackle the question of thought experiments in 
mathematics, where, as they point out, it is not at all strange to see our stock of knowledge 
increase from thought alone. A more interesting issue, they claim, is the use of sensory 
imagination in mathematical thought experiments. They provide several examples of such 
thought experiments from knot theory, graph theory and geometric group theory. Many of these 
are justified because the visualizable manipulations of mathematical objects (like knots) are tied 
directly to formal manipulations. “For foundational purposes there needs to be some way of 
fixing the subject matter in mathematical terms, so that the correctness of basic assumptions and 
methods can be proven. But once that job has been done, we may proceed without adverting to 
our foundational definitions” (this volume, 262). In their exploration of graph theory, they find 
visual imaginings that proceed “in a truly experimental way” (272). They go on: 
The utility of visual imagination depends on confining our efforts to images and image 
transformations which are simple enough for us to manipulate reliably in imagination. 
But the variety of images and image transformations that we can handle reliably suffices 
to make visual imagination a potent instrument of mental experimentation in 
mathematics. (272) 
In sum, there are thought experiments in mathematics that involve “active use of visual 
imagination” and go “beyond the application of mathematically prescribed rules, as a way of 
answering questions or overcoming obstacles” (275). Intriguingly, the epistemic support 
provided by these thought experiments is deemed empirical. This might seem counterintuitive, 
but “empirical evidence has a much larger role in the epistemology of actual mathematical belief 
acquisition than is often thought” (276). 
With some understanding of the history and disciplinary context of thought experiments, we turn 
to Part III, which presents and reappraises the main existing philosophical accounts of thought 
experiments. Our contributors develop, defend and criticize epistemological accounts that 
attempt to explain when and how a thought experiment succeeds. There is a deflationary 
empiricist account that treats thought experiments as a mere subset of arguments (Chapter 15), a 
rationalist account that treats thought experiments as possible stimulants of rational insight 
(Chapter 16), a naturalist account that portrays thought experiments as the manipulation of what 
cognitive scientists call “mental models” (Chapter 17), a transcendental account that portrays 
thought experiments both as continuous with real experiments and also as conditions for the 
possibility of real experiments (Chapter 18), and a phenomenological account that takes as 
fundamental the first-person experience of performing a thought experiment (Chapter 19). 
To introduce this section, we think it might be helpful to have a quick look at the history of these 
accounts. 
 
Some history of the philosophy of thought experiments 
  
Unfortunately, there are only a few resources concerning the history of the philosophy of thought 
experiments (e.g., Kühne 2005; Moue, Masavetas, and Karayianni 2006; Fehige and Stuart 
2014), and those sources focus mostly on philosophy of science. This can perhaps be forgiven, 
since the earliest notion of a Tankeexperiment relied for its meaning on the scientific experiment. 
This is equally true for Ørsted as it was for Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Novalis, and 
Immanuel Kant, who were writing just before Ørsted using similar notions (see Schildknecht 
1990; Daiber 2001; Fehige and Stuart 2014). The philosophers who followed Ørsted, including 
Ernst Mach, Alexius Meinong, Pierre Duhem, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos, continued to 
focus on the experimental nature of thought experiments. 
Mainstream philosophers picked up the moniker in the mid-1980s. Jonathan Dancy considered 
the use of thought experiments in ethics, and Daniel Dennett considered them in epistemology 
and metaphysics under the name of “intuition pumps.” Dancy and Dennett weren’t convinced by 
thought experiments that purported to establish certain philosophical conclusions. Skepticism 
intensified with the introduction of experimental philosophy.4 But whether the discussion takes 
place in metaphilosophy or philosophy of science, the main epistemological worry is the same: 
can these thought experiments really be doing what they seem to be doing? This question takes 
its present form in the chapters of Part III through a dialogue that we think started with Kuhn. 
Unlike Mach and those before him, Kuhn wrote about thought experiments mainly as a tool for 
motivating or justifying scientific revolutions. For Kuhn, 
A crisis induced by the failure of expectation and followed by revolution is at the heart of 
the thought- experimental situations we have been examining. Conversely, thought 
experiment is one of the essential analytic tools which are deployed during crisis and 
which then help to promote basic conceptual reform. (Kuhn 1977, 263) 
Kuhn cites Einstein’s train, Heisenberg’s microscope, and several fragments from Galileo as 
examples of thought experiments that play this role in theory change. He calls these “an 
important class of thought experiments” (260–61), and he concludes that “from thought 
experiments most people learn about their concepts and the world together” (253). 
For Kuhn, revolutionary thought experiments were not used to generate new facts, but to ease 
scientists through the arational period of crisis that exists between scientific paradigms, back to 
the rational progress of what Kuhn calls “normal science.” In a period of crisis, we must weigh 
the competing claims, methods and potentials of rival paradigms. And it seems that thought 
experiments can and have helped us partially to transcend the confines of our paradigms, which 
is necessary if we are to be convinced of a new world-view. Kuhn argues that by changing and 
exploring our world-views by means of thought experiments, we learn indirectly about the world 
as well. 
Kuhn’s answer to the question of how thought experiments fuel scientific progress did not win 
widespread acceptance, although there is still some sympathy (for example, Sorensen 1992; 
Gendler 1998; Van Dyck 2003). What is important in the present context is Kuhn’s idea that 
thought experiments play a justificatory role in science, and especially in scientific revolutions. 
 This idea was central for those who organized the first conference on thought experiments in 
1986, and it has been a point of contention ever since. The proceedings of that conference were 
published in Horowitz and Massey (1991), and on the first page of their introduction the editors 
point out that what is at stake is a “paradox” inspired by Kuhn’s paper. The paradox of thought 
experiments consists in the “puzzling fact that thought experiments often have novel empirical 
import even though they are conducted entirely inside one’s head.”5 
Kuhn’s “puzzling fact” only became a “paradox” via the ensuing debate between James Robert 
Brown and John D. Norton, which presented two clear but conflicting solutions: one with 
“epistemic magic,” and one without. Brown and Norton assumed with Kuhn that thought 
experiments could play a justificatory role in scientific revolutions, and they both took the 
scientific record as their main source of information. However, they disagreed about what 
thought experiments were and what they could do. Brown presented a Platonic theory of thought 
experiments and Norton developed an empiricist account that characterized thought experiments 
as arguments. Brown claimed that thought experiments could provide direct access to truths 
about laws of nature, which is something Norton derided as magical. Each was attempting to 
resolve Kuhn’s puzzle. 
Brown began with Galileo’s falling bodies thought experiment (see Palmieri, this volume) in 
which 
we have a transition from one theory to another which is quite remarkable. There has 
been no new empirical evidence. The old theory was rationally believed before the 
thought experiment, but was shown to be absurd by it. The thought experiment 
established rational belief in a new theory. (Brown 1986, 10) 
It does this independently of experience because “there has been no new observational data” 
(11), the conclusion does not follow deductively from the premises (11–2), and because “it is not 
a case of seeing old empirical data in a new way” (which is, Brown writes: “essentially Kuhn’s 
thesis” 1986, 11). So Brown accepted that at least some thought experiments perform the role 
that Kuhn envisaged, “a crucial role in paradigm change” (2). They play this role by providing 
reasons to reject one theory and adopt another, and those reasons are not strictly logical, nor do 
they rely solely on previous sense-experience. 
Norton also focused on revolutionary thought experiments, and he agreed with Brown 
concerning the problem: “Thought experiments in physics provide or purport to provide us 
information about the physical world. Since they are thought experiments rather than physical 
experiments, this information does not come from the reporting of new empirical data.” But he 
drew a very different conclusion: 
There is only one non-controversial source from which this information can come: it is 
elicited from information we already have by an identifiable argument … The alternative 
to this view is to suppose that thought experiments provide some new and even 
mysterious route to knowledge of the physical world. (1991, 129) 
 Norton thus presented Kuhn’s puzzle in the form of a dichotomy, bringing us to the paradox: if 
thought experiments provide new information about the physical world, yet do not require new 
information about the physical world, either the new information is a rearrangement of old data, 
or else it comes from rational insight. 
A great deal of papers and books published on thought experiments since 1991 in philosophy of 
science have mentioned or focused on this paradox.6 Most of them present Kuhn’s problem in 
slightly different terms, or call it by a different name. Given that the paradox is rarely presented 
in the same words, some writers have begun to question whether there is actually more than one 
paradox. 
For instance, Horowitz and Massey characterized the paradox in terms of the “fact that thought 
experiments often have novel empirical import even though they are conducted entirely inside 
one’s head.” Depending on how we interpret “novel,” “empirical import,” and “entirely inside 
one’s head,” we get different versions of the paradox. There are many ways for something to be 
novel, for example, by being surprising, non-derivable, or by presenting us with a previously 
non-existing belief, experience, ability, pattern, property, or relation. Likewise, there are many 
ways of having empirical import, for example, by prompting a change in our existing set of 
empirical beliefs, knowledge, evidence, understanding, information, etc. Finally, to be “inside 
one’s head” might require that the elements manipulated in a thought experiment be in the head, 
that the thought experimental process be in the head, or that the evidence that justifies the output 
of a thought experiment be in the head (for an extended discussion of these and other options, see 
Stuart 2015, ch. 1 §§3–5). 
For Brown and Norton, empirical import meant empirical knowledge. Brown and Norton 
disagreed, however, concerning the relevant sense of novelty and also concerning the sources of 
evidence in the heads of thought experimenters. 
Before considering where other philosophers in the literature stand with respect to novelty, 
empirical import and independence of experience, we’d like to summarize the two chapters in 
this volume dedicated to the views of Brown and Norton. In her chapter, Elke Brendel helpfully 
distinguishes five main sub-claims of Norton’s position. Using this framework, she explains the 
various attacks and defenses that have been made, and others that could be made, against each of 
them. She identifies one of these claims as impossible to reject without begging the question 
against Norton, and presents several powerful arguments against three others. One of the claims, 
the Reconstruction thesis, is argued to be defensible. Brendel concludes by showing that if we 
reject what she regards as the weaker of Norton’s claims, this will not commit us to Brown’s 
position.7 
In his chapter, Thomas Grundmann focuses on the two main arguments Brown gives for his 
position: 1) an inference to the best explanation, according to which Platonism is the best 
explanation for the practice of scientific thought experimentation, and 2) an argument from 
analogy that ties Platonism in mathematics to Platonism in science. Both of Brown’s arguments 
rely on a particular account of the laws of nature, namely, the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong 
account. According to this account, laws of nature are relations between universals. If it is 
correct, perhaps Brown is right that empiricism cannot explain our mental access to such 
universals and their relations. And since the rational access to the mathematical realm is also a 
matter of access to universals, we gain support for the analogy between mathematical and 
scientific thought experiments. Grundmann forcefully attacks both of the two main arguments, in 
addition to the account of laws of nature that Brown relies on. He then considers the ways in 
which Brown’s account could be revised, and closes by asking whether and how a Platonic 
account of thought experiments could deal with philosophical thought experiments. 
Faced with the extremes of rationalism and empiricism, many who contributed to the debate after 
1991 sought a middle ground. Sören Häggqvist (1996, 2009) agreed with Norton that insofar as 
thought experiments are to play an evidential role in science or philosophy, they must participate 
in arguments. That is, thought experiments are used to contest or bolster theoretical claims by 
providing (usually modal) evidence that counts for or against a claim (see Williamson 2005, 
2016 for a similar view). For Häggqvist, a thought experiment thus plays a justificatory role in 
the same way a real experiment does: by contradicting or supporting a claim made by the theory 
through participation in an argument. This makes (thought) experiments parts of arguments. 
However, Häggqvist denies Norton’s claim that the performance of a thought experiment just is 
the performance of an argument, because an experiment cannot be formally valid or invalid.8 
Häggqvist’s insight is taken up by Tim De Mey (2003), who argues that we should investigate 
the epistemic impact of the thought experiment’s conclusion in one way, and how it produces 
that conclusion in another. 
In other words, there is the conclusion of the thought experiment, which is a product of 
psychological mechanisms including imagination, memory and intuition. And there is the use of 
that conclusion in an argument for or against the truth of a claim, which might be justified in the 
standard ways identified by logicians. It is therefore important to be clear which of these two 
very different characterizations of the paradox we are addressing in any epistemological account 
of thought experiments: the reliability of the processes that bring us to the conclusion of the 
thought experiment, or the reliability of the inferences we use to make that conclusion bear on a 
theory or theoretical claim. 
There are also naturalists in the debate who claim that we can and should use science to discover 
how thought experiments work. This idea was already present in Mach (1905) and Wolfgang 
Yourgrau (1962, 1967). But Roy Sorensen was the first to give an in-depth naturalist account of 
thought experiments (1992). 
Like Häggqvist and Williamson, Sorensen portrayed thought experiments as a type of modal 
reasoning. And like Mach (1905), he placed thought experiments on a continuum with real 
experiments. Along with several others (including Richard Arthur, Alisa Bokulich, Tamar 
Gendler, Kuhn and Lichtenberg), Sorensen argued that thought experiments mostly eliminate 
irrationalities in our thought. And again following Mach, he claimed that thought experiments 
function by drawing upon the stores of empirical knowledge that we accumulate in our lifetimes, 
combined with the innate ideas and structures that have been programmed into our minds by 
evolution. This is what makes Sorensen a naturalist in particular: his use of evolutionary 
psychology to justify the reliability of thought experiments. 
Sorensen agreed with Norton that thought experiments “repackage” old information to make it 
“more informative” (1992, 4). In this sense, he adopted Norton’s notion of novelty. But his 
interpretation of empirical import is quite different. Instead of empirical knowledge, he took the 
goals of thought experiments to include the creation and stabilization of phenomena, atheoretical 
exploration, and the definition of concepts. Achieving these goals does not usually amount to 
creating new empirical knowledge in the sense of providing new justified beliefs. One important 
point to learn from Sorensen about the paradox is that empirical import can mean much more 
than empirical knowledge. Catharine Elgin (1993, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2014) has been 
focusing on thought experiments with respect to understanding instead of knowledge for some 
time. Mike Stuart (2016a, 2017, this volume) develops this idea as well. 
Since Sorensen, more naturalists have emerged, many of whom rely to some extent on the 
argument from evolution. An important subset of these characterize thought experiments as 
“mental models,” a technical term from cognitive science first applied to thought experiments 
independently and simultaneously by Nenad Miščević (1992, 2004 and 2007) and Nancy 
Nersessian (1992a, 1992b, 2007, 2008, this volume), and later by Tamar Gendler (2004) and 
others. Miščević and Nersessian agreed that “thought experiment descriptions” guide us in the 
creation of dynamic mental models which “mobilize” cognitive skills that render the outcome of 
the model manipulation epistemically efficacious. For example, we can make mental models that 
help us to produce reliable guesses about how and when water will spill out of variously shaped 
containers whose openings are tilted increasingly towards the ground. Such models draw on our 
everyday experience with containers and liquids and pouring. It is easy to see why many 
problems are easier and faster to solve when represented in a mental model as opposed to 
verbally or formally: we get to use the same abilities and knowledge we use in everyday real- life 
situations (like moving in a gravitational field), and this is (supposed to be) very different from 
working out a solution using logical inferences, as Norton would have it. 
In more detail, Nersessian argues that the narrative presentation of a thought experiment triggers 
the creation of a mental model, which is “a structural, behavioral, or functional analog to a real-
world phenomenon” (this volume, 311). The mental model is analogous in the sense that it 
preserves something of the constraints operating on the objects and events of the imagined 
phenomenon (311). Such mental models are often visual or tactile in nature, are manipulated in 
real time, draw on embodied wisdom (1992, 294), and embed a specific and personal point of 
view into the model (1992, 295). With respect to the paradox, Nersessian made a telling remark 
early on: 
The constructed situation, itself, is apprehended as pertinent to the real world in several 
ways. It can reveal something in our experience that we did not see the import of before 
… It can generate new data from the limiting case … [and] it can make us see the 
empirical consequences of something in our existing conceptions. (1992, 296) 
In other words, like Sorensen, Nersessian recognized many of the different ways empirical 
import could be interpreted. Instead of producing new knowledge, a thought experiment can 
highlight old data that did not initially seem important, it can separate phenomena that seem 
necessarily connected, it can generate new data from limiting cases, and it can clarify the 
consequences of previous conceptual commitments. 
In her chapter in this volume, Nancy J. Nersessian begins with a presentation of the varied 
advancements in the literature on mental models from psychology, cognitive science, philosophy 
and neuroimaging studies. After all, if we’re going to take seriously the suggestion that thought 
experiments are mental models in the scientist’s sense, we must understand what the scientists 
are saying. And once we do, there are many remarkable details concerning how we reason using 
models that can inform the discussion, or pose new problems. Nersessian closes by considering 
how the account relates to or subsumes other accounts already mentioned in this introduction. 
There are many important insights to gain from the naturalists. In terms of novelty, Gendler, 
Nersessian and Miščević all agree with Norton that existing knowledge can be manipulated, 
transformed or rearranged in a thought experiment to draw our attention to something we didn’t 
notice before. However, these philosophers also identify additional sources of novelty, including 
truly novel mental presentations, which could take the form of new experiences, concepts or 
beliefs. But unlike Brown, these would not be interactions with real, mind- independent abstract 
entities. Gendler, Nersessian and Miščević also agree that rearrangement can help us to 
“possess” our beliefs by giving us the power to act on them, as when a thought experiment helps 
us to overcome a fear of flying that we know is irrational. Statistical knowledge that flying is 
safe is not enough to prevent fear in some people, yet thought experiments in the form of 
repeated positive visualizations can help agents to make their statistical knowledge about the 
safety of airline travel useful (Gendler 2004, 1160). This sense of novelty concerns our abilities, 
and the relationships between our beliefs. 
One final point concerns the distinction between propositional and non-propositional cognitive 
processes. Norton claims that “The actual conduct of a thought experiment consists of the 
execution of an argument, although this may not be obvious, since the argument may appear only 
in abbreviated form and with suppressed premises” (2004b, 50). Norton could be correct that the 
best way to explain the epistemological efficacy of thought experiments is to reconstruct them as 
arguments, which are manipulations of propositions, without being correct about the additional 
claim that the actual conduct of a thought experiment is the execution of an argument. 
Nevertheless, for Norton to be correct about this additional claim, we need to know if non-
propositional cognitive processes are necessary for “the actual conduct” of a thought experiment. 
Mental modellers typically claim that such processes are necessary, or they reject the distinction 
altogether. (On this issue see Peijnenburg and Atkinson 2003, 121–5, and Goffi and Roux, this 
volume). Others have sided with Norton, arguing that we need only make reference to 
manipulations of propositions for a descriptively accurate epistemological account of thought 
experiments (e.g., Salis and Frigg forthcoming). This issue remains open. 
In addition to empiricism, rationalism and naturalism, there is a Kantian account of thought 
experiments that has been developed in detail by Marco Buzzoni (2008, 2010, 2011, 2013a, 
2013b, 2015, 2016 and this volume). According to Buzzoni, thought experiments should be 
considered from two philosophical levels of analysis. According to the first, thought experiments 
are a condition for the possibility of real experiments. That is, without thought experiments, we 
could not see objects and events as answers to questions that we put to nature. In order to 
question nature, we have to imagine different ways the world could be (2008, 116–20). Without 
our ability to distance ourselves cognitively from the actual situations in which we find 
ourselves, we would not be able to think of how things might be, and so we could not generate 
questions or hypotheses about what is. Therefore, not until we are in a position to entertain 
different hypotheses about what the world is really like (as opposed to how it merely appears) 
does experimental practice become possible. In this sense, thought experiments and real 
experiments are not the same; thought experiments are more fundamental. According to the 
second level of analysis, however, we note that thought experiments are given their content by 
experience: they put questions to nature, anticipate answers using induction and deduction, and 
must ultimately be justified by appeal to experience. In this sense, thought experiments are on a 
par with real experiments. To put it in a slogan: real experiments without thought experiments 
are blind, and thought experiments without real experiments are empty. 
One insight that results from this view is that we must be careful to differentiate between thought 
experiments as cognitive actions necessary for the scientific enterprise in general, and on the 
other hand as mental variations of variables that anticipate how nature will answer our questions. 
Failing to do this, Buzzoni argues, will force us to dismiss what is common to thought and 
laboratory experiments (as Norton must), or to misidentify thought experiments as 
epistemologically indistinguishable from laboratory experiments (as Brown’s account seems to 
allow).9 Buzzoni’s account can accommodate both views. In his chapter in this collection, 
Buzzoni updates his account, first by responding to objections made by Yiftach Fehige (2012 
and 2013), and then by mapping the terrain of possible Kantian approaches to thought 
experiments based on different interpretations of the Kantian a priori. 
Another option is to produce a phenomenological account of thought experiments (see e.g., 
Mohanty 1991; Kujundzic 1995; Froese and Gallagher 2010; Fehige and Wiltsche 2013; 
Wiltsche 2013, this volume; Hopp 2014). Phenomenology takes as fundamental the 
“phenomena,” that is, how things appear in conscious experience. One major insight of 
phenomenology is that what appears to us always outstrips our given sensory experience of it. 
Perceiving an object is not just receiving certain patterns of light on the retina; it requires 
recognizing the object as something with various properties and a certain history, which would 
appear different from different perspectives or under different conditions, and so on. Given this, 
our experience of any object (material or otherwise) consists also of our expectations, 
background knowledge, and abilities. Edmund Husserl called this expanded notion of experience 
when applied to an object, “horizontal givenness.” Harald A. Wiltsche (this volume) applies this 
phenomenological framework to thought experiments, first by providing an excellent 
introduction to phenomenology in terms that anyone can understand, and second by pointing out 
that it is not only material objects that have horizontal givenness, but imaginings as well. 
Drawing on imagined cases from The Simpsons as well as special relativity, Wiltsche presents a 
general but careful consideration of how the action of performing a thought experiment can shed 
light on the different ways that objects and events appear in the imagination, how our 
background knowledge figures into the action of thought experimentation, and how we can learn 
from the process. 
Besides rationalism, empiricism, naturalism, Kantianism and phenomenology, there are still 
other positions that are possible to take, for example, pluralism, contextualism and skepticism.10 
 And there can be combinations of existing approaches. Walter Hopp is a phenomenologist who 
treats thought experiments as fictions that give us rational access to universals (Hopp 2014), and 
one could be a Kantian who, when it comes to assessing individual thought experiments, is an 
empiricist. But we want to stress that despite the form of the above narrative, the philosophy of 
thought experiments is not a game of philosophical bingo in which we wait for all the 
philosophical -isms to be filled in and then go home. Thought experiments represent a rare four-
way intersection of history, philosophy, cognitive science, and social science, and the 
opportunity for mutual information is precious. Here, knowledge from each of these disciplines 
(and others) can come together to enhance our understanding about the powers and limits of the 
mind. Each of the philosophical -isms can therefore be expected to inform but also be informed 
by historical discoveries, and cognitive and social scientific research. 
The chapters in Part III represent much of the current state of affairs in the philosophy of thought 
experiments. Naturally, however, these chapters do not (aim to) exhaust all the possibilities. 
Addressing the questions they raise and also those that they don’t is the purpose of Part IV. 
 
Future directions 
 
One lacuna in the above discussion is the lack of engagement between mainstream philosophy 
and philosophy of science. The first several chapters of Part IV help to address this. In the first, 
Stephen Stich and Kevin Tobia discuss the role of intuition in philosophical thought experiments 
and the impact of experimental philosophy. They begin by differentiating intuitions stimulated 
by thought experiments that are used as evidence for claims about “in-the- head mental entities” 
(like the content or extension of concepts, or the warrant for implicit or tacit theories) versus 
“outside-the-head non-psychological entities” (like universals, modal or moral truths, or natural 
kinds). Their primary question echoes the paradox/puzzle mentioned above: how can intuitions 
about philosophical thought experiments be evidence for claims about extra-mental entities? 
While we lack a good story for why such intuitions might be thought to be reliable sources of 
evidence for extra-mental entities, experimental philosophy provides a set of powerful reasons to 
be skeptical about those intuitions. Stich and Tobia introduce and summarize what they take to 
be the major relevant insights of experimental philosophy, and then turn to some criticisms. They 
consider and reject the “expertise” defense, according to which the intuitions of professional 
philosophers are less vulnerable to irrelevant factors, and another defense that restricts what we 
mean by “intuition” in a way that would enable us to avoid the charges of experimental 
philosophy. This latter defense is one taken up by Kirk Ludwig, author of the second chapter of 
Part IV. 
Kirk Ludwig asks what experimental philosophy would have to be like if it were to justify the 
skeptical conclusions of Stich and Tobia and others. Ludwig breaks experimental philosophy 
down into several sub-kinds, presents the main contemporary criticisms of experimental 
philosophy, and argues that experimental philosophy as it stands cannot cast serious doubt on the 
use of thought experiments in philosophy. It can display variation in intuitions, but this does not 
demonstrate the further claim that philosophical intuitions are mistaken, or that folk intuitions are 
correct. According to Ludwig, these further claims cannot be addressed using survey-based 
methods. Of course, this does not mean that experimental philosophy is not useful for 
philosophy; on the contrary, it can alert us to important cognitive biases and defects, it can help 
us design better thought experiments, and be better teachers to our students. Ludwig closes with 
a five-point reply to the criticisms of Stich and Tobia. 
Sticking with thought experiments in philosophy, Sören Häggqvist and Daniel Cohnitz discuss a 
specific and very common kind of philosophical thought experiment, namely, the 
counterexample. For these thought experiments to succeed, they typically require the evaluation 
of at least one modal claim, usually a counterfactual, which raises the following question 
(another echo of the paradox): what reason(s) do we have to think that thought experiments can 
be reliable guides to modal claims?11 To address the problem, several formal reconstructions of 
the use of thought experiments as modal defeaters are considered, as well as the possibility of 
skepticism raised by experimental philosophy, and insights from the literature on the inference 
from conceivability to possibility (e.g., Gendler and Hawthorne 2002). Like Stich and Tobia, 
Häggqvist and Cohnitz vote for pluralism: different subfields of philosophy might require 
different things from thought experimental intuitions, and different epistemological accounts 
might be necessary. They finish by urging a closer connection between the discussion of thought 
experiments in metaphilosophy and philosophy of science. In both subfields, they argue, the 
dialectical context of a thought experiment appears necessary for a full epistemological account. 
This is an idea also championed by Goffi and Roux in Chapter 24. 
In the next chapter, James W. McAllister considers cross-cultural and historical comparisons of 
thought experiments to “problematize the category of thought experiment and its application in 
different historical and cultural contexts” (425). He does this by asking where different 
communities draw the line between thought experiments and other kinds of reasoning, when they 
use thought experiments, and under which conditions thought experiments are taken to have 
evidential significance. These issues are closely connected to the metaphilosophical issues of the 
previous three chapters, to the metaphysical concerns of the final chapter, but also to the entire 
first two parts of the collection, in which we find displayed exactly the sorts of differences 
McAllister examines. Based on these observations, McAllister argues against using the term 
“thought experiment” for any inference occurring before Galileo. In so doing, McAllister takes 
the contextual nature of thought experimental justification even further than Cohnitz and 
Häggqvist and Stich and Tobia. He employs a fully historicized view of evidential significance, 
according to which something counts as evidence only in a given socio-historical context. 
Because of this, ancient Greeks, for example, would not have accepted thought experiments as a 
method with evidential significance since they would not have accepted experiment in general as 
such a method. McAllister considers the use of thought experiments in the discipline of history 
as well as in the philosophical traditions of India and China to provide additional reasons against 
imperialistically labelling various imaginative activities as thought experiments. 
 Taking seriously the contextual and dialectical nature of thought experiments suggested by the 
previous chapters, Jean-Yves Goffi and Sophie Roux present a dialectical account of the logic of 
thought experiments. They argue that all thought experiments require the entertainment of a 
scenario, the mental manipulation of which requires non-propositional knowledge (knowledge-
how, tacit knowledge, etc.). Meanwhile, for thought experiments to produce propositional 
knowledge, they must also trade in propositions. However, no propositional reconstruction could 
ever be completely filled in, and this renders thought experiments irreducibly “opaque.” 
According to them, a more complete account must admit the importance of propositional 
reasoning while accounting for this irreducible opacity. They argue that dialectical accounts of 
reasoning were created to deal with exactly this sort of opacity, since in the dialectical exchanges 
of natural conversation we operate without agreed upon rules or definite background 
assumptions. They examine three different ways dialectic argumentation theory has been 
developed in the twentieth century, and argue in favour of Nicholas Rescher’s account (1977), 
which they apply to thought experiments. 
When we want to circumscribe the epistemological power of thought experiments, we often 
focus on successful instances. But an equally fruitful way of proceeding is to concentrate on 
those that fail. One very helpful example is given by John D. Norton in Chapter 25, “The Worst 
Thought Experiment.” This is a thought experiment proposed by Leo Szilard in 1929, which was 
presented as a development of Maxwell’s demon. Through a characteristically clear historical 
account, Norton identifies two important features of our interaction with thought experiments. 
First, we allow “extensive latitude” to the creator of a thought experiment in introducing 
idealizations, which are necessary to focus the narrative. Second, we typically presume with the 
creator of the thought experiment that the case considered is a typical one, from which an 
inductive generalization can follow. Norton explains the failure of Szilard’s thought experiment 
in terms of its (mis)use of both of these features. 
Following Norton’s discussion of idealization in Szilard’s thought experiment, Julian Reiss 
analyzes the role of idealizations in thought experiments in general. First, he distinguishes 
several kinds of idealizations, and argues that only one is relevant to this discussion: what Ernan 
McMullin called “Galilean idealizations.” Of the subtypes of Galilean idealization, Reiss 
concentrates on causal idealizations, or in other words, those that “isolate a single causal line.” 
Reiss asks how and under which conditions such idealizations can be justified. He identifies two 
conditions, one epistemic and another empirical. To satisfy the epistemic condition, there must 
be some way to know what would happen in the idealized single causal line. One way is to look 
at an asymptotic series of material idealizations and infer to the extreme case, like experimenting 
with increasingly smooth objects to infer to the behaviour of frictionless ones. To satisfy the 
empirical condition, the idealization must be informative concerning the behaviour of the same 
causal line when in the non-idealized context of the real world. Reiss argues that these two 
conditions explain why we see more thought experiments in some domains than others. 
Reliance on idealizations is one of many features thought experiments share with computer 
simulations. Their similarity has inspired strong claims, such as the prediction that in some 
domains, computer simulations will replace thought experiments altogether (Chandrasekharan, 
Nersessian, and Subramanian 2013). In Chapter 27, Johannes Lenhard reviews and tackles 
various comparisons between thought experiments and computer simulations. Despite the 
similarities, Lenhard argues that the production of intuitions is importantly different from the 
automated iterations of formal algorithms, and that this has epistemological ramifications. Most 
notably, computer simulations can be opaque in the sense that they are not completely accessible 
to epistemic assessment, and this is because there is a type of iteration they employ that would be 
impossible in a thought experiment. This sort of iteration is displayed in Schelling’s model of 
social segregation, the Ising model, complex systems models like dynamic meteorological 
models, and models that approximate the Schrödinger equation for systems of molecules too 
complicated to solve directly. Because of the differences in iteration-type, different 
epistemological accounts will be needed to explain the different strengths and weaknesses of 
computer simulations and thought experiments. 
Lenhard concludes by discussing the common historical roots of thought experiments and 
computer simulations. For one thing, both emerge from a natural need and ability to explore 
hypothetical possibilities. Whatever we call this ability in the silicone domain, in humans we 
tend to call it imagination. In Letitia Meynell’s “Images and Imagination in Thought 
Experiments” (Chapter 28), we get an in-depth look at the imaginative core of human thought 
experiments. Part of Meynell’s project is to bring together insights from the literature on 
imagination in philosophy of mind and aesthetics. Through a discussion of how we interact 
imaginatively with images, Meynell considers the strengths and weaknesses of images in the 
context of thought experimentation. For instance, Einstein’s train is accompanied by an image in 
the original text that might not be necessary to justify the conclusion of the thought experiment, 
but which serves as an extra “prop” (in the sense of Walton 1990) that directs us to imagine 
scenarios in certain ways, reassures novices that they are imagining the right things, and 
foregrounds certain aspects of the imaginary scenarios as well as certain skills and subsets of 
background knowledge. And because there aren’t any norms dictating how we must approach a 
given image, for example, from right to left or top to bottom, we are encouraged to work through 
it ourselves, which compliments the experimental nature of thought experiments. Meynell closes 
with some epistemological considerations about how to justify uses of the imagination in thought 
experiments. 
There are other ways to bring aesthetics to bear on the topic of thought experiments. For 
example, Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009) argue that it is not just background assumptions that we 
rely on in a thought experiment, but our ability to interact with stories. Perhaps the human brain 
has evolved some reliable way of forming modal inferences from imagining what would be true 
in a fictional world, and thought experiments take advantage of this. Such an account would 
work nicely with the mental models account, since fictionalism about scientific models has also 
been a popular topic in philosophy of science for some time, and if thought experiments are used 
as models are, then insights from that literature can be brought to bear. 
David Davies presents just such a combination. An on-going question in philosophy of art 
concerns how we learn from fiction. One might think that all literary and cinematic fiction could 
do in order to increase our stock of knowledge would be to suggest hypotheses for empirical 
study. That is, we might think that works of artistic fiction are (at best) confined to the context of 
discovery. On the other hand, we don’t (always) make this same claim for the thought 
experiments found in science and philosophy. A number of issues are pertinent to a defense of 
the possibility of learning through fiction by comparison with thought experiments. For one, in 
science we make explicit claims about the world, and there are (at least conventional) epistemic 
standards by which we can judge whether those claims are true or warranted. This does not seem 
to be the case in fiction, as fictions typically do not make explicit claims about the world and 
there are typically no standards by which to judge the epistemic value of their content. These are 
the “no-argument” and “no-evidence” problems, respectively. That is, fictions make no 
arguments that the world is a certain way, and they provide no evidence independent of what the 
reader herself brings to the fiction. After arguing against several influential accounts of learning 
through fiction, Davies presents his account of what it means to be a fictional narrative, and 
argues that thought experiments in science and philosophy satisfy it. He then provides a helpful 
taxonomy of epistemological views on the issue of learning from fiction ranging from extreme 
deflationism to extreme inflationism, and selects “moderate inflationism” as the best option. This 
view is meant to cohere with the mental models account of thought experiments, according to 
which thought experiments mobilize unarticulated cognitive resources to learn something new 
about the world from fiction. Davies argues that this survives the “no-evidence” objection 
because through such mobilization, a fiction can make us aware of patterns that “underlie the 
complexity of prior and present actual experience” (this volume, 521). And it survives the “no-
argument” objection because we test the fiction’s claims through our engagement with it, so we 
need not appeal to anything external to the fiction. Several interesting questions remain, 
however. For instance, how do we apply this moderate inflationist account to thought 
experiments in film, which are not “verbally mediated” as most thought experiments are? 
Like Meynell and Davies, Michael T. Stuart also seeks to connect the discussion of thought 
experiments to insights in another philosophical subdomain. In this case, we are directed to the 
literature on understanding. Stuart argues that the epistemological challenge of thought 
experiments is equally interesting when phrased in terms of understanding as when phrased in 
terms of knowledge. He proposes three ways that thought experiments can increase 
understanding of x: by explaining x, making x more meaningful, and making x more fruitful. He 
argues that these different ways of enhancing understanding can yield the different types of 
understanding identified in the epistemological literature. To address the question of how 
thought experiments produce understanding, Stuart draws on new work in epistemology and 
aesthetics by Elizabeth Camp and Alison Hills. 
In the final chapter, Alisa Bokulich and Mélanie Frappier critically appraise various definitions 
of thought experiments to see if anything definite can be said. Bokulich and Frappier must deal 
with several related challenges: First, what makes two thought experiments similar enough to be 
counted as repetitions of the same experiment? Second, how do we accommodate the insight that 
what counts as equal will itself be relative to the purposes of classification? That is, for some 
purposes historical continuity is what matters, for others it is propositional content or structural 
form. Third, and closely related: do thought experiments change over time, and if so, how? To 
answer these questions, Bokulich and Frappier take up a pluralist stance. They argue that what 
counts as identical depends on what we think thought experiments are. If they are intuition 
pumps, identical thought experiments should produce the same intuitions. Given the variability 
of intuitions mentioned by Stich and Tobia and Cohnitz and Häggqvist, perfect identify between 
two thought experiments might be rare. If thought experiments are sets of premises and a 
conclusion, thought experiments cannot change or be modified (except in the order or 
presentation of the premises, or in the irrelevant but picturesque details of the narrative). If 
thought experiments are mental models, then the thought experiment outstrips its linguistic 
presentation. While there are worries about what might count as equal for the (essentially 
private) mental models, there might be enough to give thought experiments identities which can 
be modified over time. If thought experiments are props for the imagination (Salis and Frigg 
forthcoming; Meynell 2014, this volume) then for each thought experiment there are two sets of 
fictional truths, one that is objective and socially shared, and one that is created in the subjective 
imagination of each participant using their own principles of generation (see Meynell, this 
volume). Since these sets differ, we can explain why two different conclusions can be drawn 
from the same thought experiment: the principles that generated the intersubjective sets of 
fictional truths were different, or improperly applied by one party, or the same but insufficiently 
clear. This will not describe all cases, however, since in many it is not just the principles of 
generation that are different or variously applied, but the narrative itself that is changed, 
sometimes drastically. Finally, if thought experiments are experiments, they will be replicated 
just like other kinds of experiments. Again, however, there are different aspects of experiments 
that can be replicated. This brings us again to the “dual- structure view” of thought experiments 
(originally inspired by Hans Radder’s dual view of laboratory experiments (1996) which was 
developed by Häggqvist and De Mey. However Bokulich and Frappier point out that this account 
might still be insufficient to capture certain important cases. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
We hope Part IV of the collection furthers the existing debates about thought experiments, and 
creates conceptual space for new competing accounts and issues. As a whole, we hope the 
companion invites discussion, criticism and comparison in as many new directions as possible. 
Before concluding, we want to emphasize again that the distinctions between the parts of this 
companion are not, and could not be, strict. The chapters in Parts I and II present new research, 
much of which pertains directly to the soundness of the arguments in Parts III and IV. For 
example, if Paolo Palmieri is correct in his re-telling of the history of Galileo’s falling bodies 
thought experiment, this might impact those philosophical accounts that rely heavily on the 
features of this thought experiment as evidence (perhaps including McAllister 1996, this volume; 
Norton 1996; Gendler 1998 and Brown 2011). And the accounts presented in Parts III and IV 
will inspire new ways to interpret the examples considered in Parts I and II. To this end, we have 
encouraged as much interaction between the chapters of the different parts of this book as 
possible, and we hope this has improved the collection. 
Of course, fruitful interaction between history, philosophy and social and cognitive science has 
been present in the literature on thought experiments since its beginning. Accordingly, most 
chapters in this companion present historical arguments with epistemological and metaphysical 
assumptions in mind, or philosophical arguments that depend on specific readings of history, 
cognitive science, or social psychology. Thus, while the parts of this book are separated in a way 
that we hope will make them easy to access and pleasant to read, the distinctions between the 
parts are always more or less artificial. For instance, Kenneth Westphal’s chapter (Part I) could 
easily have been in Part IV, and James McAllister’s chapter (Part IV) could easily have been in 
Part I. 
One final point: this collection draws together many different sorts of first and second order 
knowledge, including: (1) expertise in the history and methods of the disciplines discussed in the 
chapters (theology, history, philosophy, physics, biology, etc.), and (2) expertise in the fields 
from which the analyses are carried out, that is: history, sociology, cognitive science and 
philosophy as they are currently practiced. No one of the three editors of this companion 
pretends to possess such comprehensive knowledge. But rather than cater the chapters to what an 
average reader could digest, we’ve chosen to include a wide range of chapters all of which rely 
to some degree on different background knowledge, in order to maximize breadth. For example, 
Lenhard assumes familiarity with Monte Carlo simulations and Markov chains, while Palmieri 
assumes some Husserl. We hope the reader finds this exciting rather than discouraging. 
The topic of thought experiments – perhaps because it draws together so many disciplines – 
appears boundless. Though much has been covered, there is very much more to be done. As at 
least one of us is inclined to say: Welcome to Plato’s heaven. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Please see also our special index cataloguing the thought experiments discussed in this 
Companion (page 558). 
2 For Searle’s Chinese room, see Arthur (this volume). For Rawls’ original position, see 
Miščević (this volume), and Brun (this volume). For Plato’s thought experiments, see Becker 
(this volume). For the trolley problem, see Brun (this volume). For more philosophical thought 
experiments, see Dennett (2013). 
3 For Lucretius’ thought experiment, see Brown (2011), Ierodiakonou (2011), Brown and 
Stuart (2013); Meynell (this volume). For Maxwell’s demon, see Brown (2011), Buzzoni (2008, 
97–100), Krimsky (1973), Myrvold (2011), Norton (this volume), Peacocke (this volume), 
Schlesinger (1996, 473–76), Stuart (2016a). For Einstein’s thought experiments, see Norton 
(1991) Peacocke (this volume), Meynell (this volume). For Schrödinger’s cat, see Peacocke (this 
volume). For Newton’s thought experiments, see Arthur (this volume), Norton (1996); 
Peijnenburg and Atkinson (2003); Brown (2011). For Heisenberg’s microscope, see Popper 
(1959), Stuart (2016a), Van Dyck (2003), and Camilleri (2007). For Galileo’s thought 
experiments, see Brown (2011), Norton (1996), Gendler (1998, 2000), Buzzoni (2008, 106–7), 
Palmieri (2003, this volume), McAllister (1996, this volume). For Stevin’s chain, see Brown 
(2011), Norton (1996, 349–51), and Mach (1905). For thought experiments in mathematics, see 
Buzzoni (2011), Witt-Hansen (1976), Müller (1969), Brown (1999, 2007a/b), Glas (1999), Van 
Bendegem (2003), Sherry (2006), Starikova (2007), Starikova and Giaquinto (this volume) and 
Cohnitz (2008). For thought experiments in geometry, see Lakatos (1976). In infinity, see Galilei 
(1638, 32), and Hilbert (2013). 
4 See Antsey and Vanzo (2016) for a look at the relationship between experimental 
philosophy and thought experiments going back to the seventeenth century. See also Systema 
and Buckwalter (2016), Stich and Tobia (this volume), Ludwig (this volume) and Cohnitz and 
Häggqvist (this volume). 
5 This wording is pretty close to the way Kuhn framed the problem, although not exactly. 
In Kuhn’s words the problem is: “How, then, relying exclusively upon familiar data, can a 
thought experiment lead to new knowledge or to a new understanding of nature?” (1977, 241). 
6 E.g., Aligica and Evans (2009), Arthur (1999), Bishop (1998, 1999), Bokulich (2001), 
Brendel (2004), Brown (1991a, 1992, 2004, 2007a), Butkovic (2007), Buzzoni (2008), Camilleri 
(2014), Chandrasekharan, Nersessian and Subramanian (2013), Clatterbuck (2013), Cooper 
(2005), Davies (2007), De Baere (2003), De Mey (2003, 2005, 2006a, 2006b), Ducheyne (2006), 
Fehige (2012, 2013), Gendler (1998, 2000, 2004), Georgiou (2007), Gooding (1992, 1994), 
Häggqvist (1996, 2007, 2009), Hopp (2014), Horowitz and Massey (1991), Humphreys (1993), 
Irvine (1991), Kujundzic (1998), Laymon (1991), Machery (2011), McAllister (1996), McComb 
(2013), Moue, Masavetas, and Karayianni (2006), Nersessian (1992, 2007). Norton (1991, 1996, 
2004a), Pitcha (2011), Roberts (1993), Schlesinger (1996), Shepard (2008). Sorensen (1992), 
Urbaniak (2012) and Wilson (1991). 
7 For other criticisms of Norton’s view, see e.g., Gendler (1998) and Stuart (2016b). 
8 See Brendel (this volume) for criticism of Häggqvist’s use of this argument against 
Norton. 
9 More needs to be said here: Brown does portray the intuitive aspect of a thought 
experiment as something akin to sense experience, though he does not agree that he is committed 
to there being only one kind of epistemological account for both sense experience and rational 
insight. 
10 Examples of pluralists might be Bokulich and Frappier (this volume), Cohnitz and 
Häggqvist (this volume) and Stich and Tobia (this volume), while Rachel Cooper (2005) argues 
against pluralism. An example of a contextualist might be McAllister (this volume). Norton 
(2004a and 2004b) argues against this approach, since for him the mark of a good thought 
experiment “cannot be something external to the thought experiment; that is, something about 
the person who authors the thought experiment or about the context in which it is proposed” 
(2004b, 54). Almost all who write on thought experiments are skeptical concerning at least some 
of their uses, but it is difficult to find anyone who is skeptical about thought experiments tout 
court. For example, Pierre Duhem is often quoted as a skeptic, but Buzzoni argues convincingly 
that he was only drawing attention to some of the dangers we face when putting too much weight 
on them (Buzzoni forthcoming). Daniel Dennett has been cited as a skeptic by many, and 
perhaps for good reason: he calls thought experiments “intuitions pumps,” and admits that his 
first use of this term “was derogatory” (1996, 182). But again, his skepticism was only directed 
toward the over-confident use of thought experiments. In later work, he writes, 
If you look at the history of philosophy, you see that all the great and influential stuff has 
been technically full of holes but utterly memorable and vivid. They are what I call 
‘intuition pumps’ – lovely thought experiments. Like Plato’s cave, and Descartes’s evil 
demon, and Hobbes’ vision of the state of nature and the social contract, and even Kant’s 
idea of the categorical imperative. I don’t know of any philosopher who thinks any one of 
those is a logically sound argument for anything. But they’re wonderful imagination 
grabbers, jungle gyms for the imagination. They structure the way you think about a 
problem. These are the real legacy of the history of philosophy. A lot of philosophers 
have forgotten that, but I like to make intuition pumps. (Dennett 1996, 182) 
Paul Thagard is another candidate for a skeptic. He argues that “the made-up thought 
experiments favored by many philosophers are not evidence at all” (2010, 209). Rather, 
“philosophical attempts to establish truths by a priori reasoning, thought experiments, or 
conceptual analysis have been no more successful than faith-based thinking has been. All these 
methods serve merely to reinforce existing prejudices” (2010, 41). Still, Thagard allows thought 
experiments a function in science, and his naturalism about philosophy implies that the same 
methods should be used there as in science, which a fortiori grants a role for thought experiments 
in philosophy (see Stuart 2014. See also Buzzoni 2016; and Fehige, this volume). The best 
candidate for a true skeptic might be Alexius Meinong, who argues against Mach that “an 
experiment that in fact does not exist at all, can neither prove nor teach anything” (1907, 276–
77). 
11 This question can also be thought of as an instantiation of Stich and Tobia’s main 
question, given that modal claims are one of the extra-mental entities they discuss. 
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